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Abstract
The concrete efficiency of secure computation has been the focus
of many recent works. In this work, we present concretely-efficient
protocols for secure 3-party computation (3PC) over a ring of inte-
gers modulo 2ℓ tolerating one corruption, both with semi-honest
andmalicious security. Owing to the fact that computation over ring
emulates computation over the real-world system architectures,
secure computation over ring has gained momentum of late.
Cast in the offline-online paradigm, our constructions present
the most efficient online phase in concrete terms. In the semi-honest
setting, our protocol requires communication of 2 ring elements per
multiplication gate during the online phase, attaining a per-party
cost of less than one element. This is achieved for the first time in
the regime of 3PC. In the malicious setting, our protocol requires
communication of 4 elements per multiplication gate during the
online phase, beating the state-of-the-art protocol by 5 elements.
Realized with both the security notions of selective abort and fair-
ness, the malicious protocol with fairness involves slightly more
communication than its counterpart with abort security for the
output gates alone.
We apply our techniques from 3PC in the regime of secure server-
aided machine-learning (ML) inference for a range of prediction
functions– linear regression, linear SVM regression, logistic re-
gression, and linear SVM classification. Our setting considers a
model-owner with trained model parameters and a client with a
query, with the latter willing to learn the prediction of her query
based on the model parameters of the former. The inputs and com-
putation are outsourced to a set of three non-colluding servers. Our
constructions catering to both semi-honest and the malicious world,
invariably perform better than the existing constructions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) [10, 36, 64], the holy grail
of secure distributed computing, enables a set ofnmutually distrust-
ing parties to perform joint computation on their private inputs,
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in a way that no coalition of t parties can learn more information
than the output (privacy) or affect the true output of the compu-
tation (correctness). While MPC, in general, has been a subject
of extensive research, the area of MPC with a small number of
parties in the honest majority setting [4, 16, 18, 33, 51] has drawn
popularity of late mainly due to its efficiency and simplicity. Fur-
thermore, most real-time applications involve a small number of
parties. Applications such as statistical and financial data analy-
sis [14], email-filtering [44], distributed credential encryption [51],
Danish sugar beet auction [15] involve 3 parties. Well-known MPC
frameworks such as VIFF [35], Sharemind [13] have been explored
with 3 parties. Recent advances in secure machine learning (ML)
based on MPC have shown applications with a small number of
parties [49, 50, 52, 59, 63]. MPCwith a small number of parties helps
solve MPC over large population as well via server-aided computa-
tion, where a small number of servers jointly hold the input data
of the large population and run an MPC protocol evaluating the
desired function.
With motivations galore, the specific problem of three-party
computation (3PC) tolerating one corruption has received phe-
nomenal attention of late [2, 4, 16, 19, 33, 38, 47, 51, 55, 55, 58].
Leveraging honest majority, this setting allows to attain stronger
security goals such as fairness (corrupt party receives the output
only if all honest parties receive output) which are otherwise im-
possible with dishonest-majority [21]. In this work, we revisit the
concrete efficiency of 3PC and to be specific, the efficiency of the
input-dependent computation.
The two typical lines of constructions that the regime of MPC
over small population offer are– high-throughput [2–4, 19, 33, 55],
and low-latency [16, 18, 37, 38, 51, 58] protocols. Relying on secret
sharing mechanism, the former category requires low communi-
cation overhead (bandwidth) and simple computations. Catering
to low-latency networks, this category takes a number of com-
munication rounds proportional to the multiplicative depth of the
circuit representing the function to be computed. On the other
hand, the other category, relying on garbled circuits, requires a
constant number of communication rounds and serve better in
high-latency networks such as the Internet. The focus of this work
is high-throughput 3PC.
Almost all high-throughput protocols evaluate a circuit that
represents the function f to be computed in a secret-shared fash-
ion. Informally, the parties jointly maintain the invariant that for
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each wire in the circuit, the exact value over that wire is avail-
able in a secret-shared fashion among the parties, in a way that
the adversary learns no information about the exact value from
the shares of the corrupt parties. Upon completion of the circuit
evaluation, the parties jointly reconstruct the secret-shared func-
tion output. Intuitively, the security holds as no intermediate value
is revealed during the computation. The deployed secret-sharing
schemes are typically linear, ensuring non-interactive evaluation
of the linear gates. The communication is required only for the
non-linear (i.e.multiplication) gates in the circuit. The focus then
turns on improving the communication overhead per multiplica-
tion gate. Recent literature has seen a range of customized linear
secret-sharing schemes over a small number of parties, boosting
the performance for multiplication gate spectacularly [2, 33, 37].
In an interesting direction towards improving efficiency, MPC
protocols are suggested to be cast in two phases– an offline phase
that performs input-independent computation and an online phase
that performs fast input-dependent computation utilizing the offline
computation [6]. The offline phase, run in advance, generates ‘raw
material’ in a relatively expensive way to yield a blazing-fast on-
line phase. This is very useful in a scenario where a set of parties
agreed to perform a specific computation repetitively over a period
of time. The parties can batch together the offline computations
and generate a large volume of offline data to support the execution
of multiple online phases. Popularly referred as offline-online para-
digm [6], there are constructions abound that show effectiveness
of this paradigm both in the theoretical [6–9, 11, 20] and practical
[5, 22, 26–28, 41–43, 59] regime.
In yet another direction to improve practical efficiency, secure
computation for arithmetic circuits over rings has gained momen-
tum of late, while traditionally fields have been the default choice.
Computation over rings models computation in the real-life com-
puter architectures such as computation over CPU words of size
32 or 64 bits. In 3PC setting, the work of [13] supports arithmetic
circuits over arbitrary ringswith passive security, while [2] offers ac-
tive security. The works of [27, 31] improve online communication
over arbitrary rings with active security, yet fall back to computa-
tion over large prime-order fields in the offline phase. This forces
the developer to depend on external libraries for fields (which are
10×-100× slower) compared to the real-world system architectures
based on 32-bit and 64-bit rings.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this work, we follow the offline-online paradigm and propose
3PC constructions over a ring Z2ℓ (that include Boolean ring Z21 )
with the most efficient online phase in concrete terms. Though the
focus lies on the online phase, the cost of offline phase is respected
and is kept in check. We present a range of constructions satisfying
semi-honest and malicious security. We apply our techniques for se-
cure prediction for a range of prediction functions in the outsourced
setting and build a number of constructions tolerating semi-honest
and malicious adversary. A common feature that all our construc-
tions exude is that function-dependent communication is needed
amongst fewer than three pairs in the online phase, yielding better
online performance. We elaborate on our contributions.
Secure 3PC. Our 3PC protocol with semi-honest security requires
communication of two elements per multiplication during the on-
line phase. The per-party online cost of our protocol is less than one
element per multiplication, a property achieved for the first time in
the 3PC setting. This improvement comes from the use of a form
of linear secret-sharing scheme inspired from the work of [37] that
allows offloading the task of one of the parties in the offline phase
and requires only two parties to talk to each other in the online
phase. This essentially implies that the evaluation of multiplication
gates in the online phase requires the presence of just two parties,
unlike the previous protocols [2, 4, 19, 33, 47] that insist all the
three parties be awake throughout the computation. One exception
is the case of Chameleon [59], where two parties perform the online
computation with the help of correlated randomness generated by
a semi-trusted party in the offline phase. Though the model looks
similar in the semi-honest setting, we achieve a stronger security
guarantee by allowing the third party to be maliciously corrupted.
Moreover, our multiplication protocol in the semi-honest setting
requires an online communication of 2 ring elements as opposed
to 4 of [59]. We achieve this 2× improvement while maintaining
the same offline cost (1 element) of [59].
For the malicious case, our protocol requires a total communica-
tion of four elements per multiplication during the online phase.
The state-of-the-art protocol over rings requires nine ring elements
per multiplication in the online phase. Lastly, we boost the security
of our malicious protocol to fairness without affecting its cost per
multiplication. The inflation inflicted is purely for the output gates
and to be specific for output reconstruction. The key contribution of
the fair protocol lies in constructing a fair reconstruction protocol
that ensures a corrupt party receives the output if and only if the
honest parties receive. The fair reconstruction does not resort to a
broadcast channel and instead rely on a new concept of ‘proof of
origin’ that tackles the confusion a sender can infuse in the absence
of broadcast channel by sending different messages to its fellow
parties over private channels.
In Table 1, we compare our work with the most relevant works.
The communication specifies the number of bits that needs to be
communicated per multiplication gate in the amortized sense.
Semi-honest Malicious
Ref. Offline Online Ref. Offline Online Fair?
[4] 0 3ℓ [2] 12ℓ 9ℓ ✗
This ℓ 2ℓ This 21ℓ 4ℓ ✓
Table 1: Concrete Comparison of our 3PC protocols
Secure ML Prediction. The growing influx of data makes ML a
promising applied science, touching human life like never before.
Its potential can be leveraged to advance areas such as medicine
[32], facial recognition [60], banking, recommendation services,
threat analysis, and authentication technologies. Many technology
giants such as Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Apple are offering cloud-
based ML services to their customers both in the form of training
platforms that train models on customer data and pre-trained mod-
els that can be used for inference, often referred as ‘ML as a Service
(MLaaS)’. However, these huge promises can only be unleashed
when rightful privacy concerns, due to ethical, legal or competitive
reasons, can be brought to control via privacy-preserving tech-
niques. This is when privacy-preserving techniques such as MPC
meets ML, with the former serving extensively in an effective way
both for secure training and prediction [25, 45, 48, 50, 52, 59, 63].
This has a huge impact on the efficiency
In this work, we target secure prediction where a model-owner
holding the model parameters enables a client to receive a predic-
tion result to its query as per themodel, respecting privacy concerns
of each other. Following the works of [49, 50, 52, 59, 63], we en-
vision a server-aided setting where the inputs and computation
are outsourced to a set of servers. We consider some of the widely
used ML algorithms, namely linear regression and linear support
vector machines (SVM) regression for regression task and logistic
regression and SVM classification for classification task [12, 30]. We
propose an efficient protocol for secure comparison that is an impor-
tant building block for classification task. We exploit the asymmetry
in our secret sharing scheme and forgo expensive primitives such
as garbled circuits or parallel prefix adders, which are used in [52]
and [50]. As emphasized below, our technique allows attaining a
constant round complexity for classification tasks.
In Table 2, we compare our results with the best-known construc-
tion of ABY3 [50] that uses 3-server setting. As the main focus of
ABY3 is training, they develop an efficient technique for fixed-point
multiplication in shared fashion, tackling the overflow and accuracy
issues in the face of repeated multiplications. Such techniques can
be avoided for functions inducing circuit of multiplicative depth
one. Hence we compare with the version of ABY3 that skips this and
present below a consolidated comparison in terms of communica-
tion. Following the works in the domain of server-aided prediction,
we only count the cost incurred by the servers to compute the
output in shared form from the inputs in shared form, ignoring
the cost for sharing the inputs and reconstructing the output. ‘Reg’
denotes regression, ‘Class’ denotes classification and ‘Round’ de-
notes the number of online rounds. Here ℓ denotes the size of the
underlying ring Z2ℓ (in bits) and d denotes the number of features.
The values in Table 2 indicate that our protocol clearly outperforms
Ref. Param.
Semi-honest Malicious
Reg Class Reg Class
ABY3
Offline 0 0 12dℓ 12dℓ + 24ℓ
Online 3ℓ 9ℓ 9dℓ 9dℓ + 18ℓ
Round 1 log ℓ + 1 1 log ℓ + 1
This
Offline ℓ ℓ 21dℓ 21dℓ + 46ℓ
Online 2ℓ 4ℓ + 2 2dℓ + 2ℓ 2dℓ + 8ℓ + 1
Round 1 3 1 4
Table 2: Concrete Comparison of Our ML Protocols
ABY3, in terms of online communication in all the settings. In the
semi-honest setting, this is achieved since we are able to shift 33%
of the overall communication to the offline phase. In the malicious
setting, online communication is further improved because of our
efficient dot-product protocol. Moreover, our novel construction for
secure comparison allows the classification protocols to be round
constant unlike ABY3 which requires log ℓ + 1 rounds.
Implementation. For 3PC, we implement our protocols over a
ring Z232 and compare with the state-of-the-art protocols, namely
[4] in the semi-honest setting and [2] in the malicious setting. We
use latency (runtime) and online throughput as the parameters for
the comparison. The online throughput in LAN setting is computed
as the number of AES circuits computed per second in the online
phase. As an AES circuit requires more than a second in WAN
setting, we take a different measure which is the number of AND
gates per second. We observe that our protocols improve the online
throughput of the existing one by a factor of 1.05× to 1.51× over
various settings. For the WAN setting, this improvement translates
to computing additionalANDgates of the range 1.44 to 4.39millions
per second.
For secure prediction, we implement our work using MNIST [46]
dataset where d = 784 and with ℓ = 64 in both LAN and WAN set-
ting. We observe an improvement of 1.02× to 2.56× over ABY3 [50],
in terms of online throughput, over various settings for regression
algorithms. For classification algorithms, the improvement ranges
from 1.5× to 2.93×.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
We consider a set of three parties P = {P0, P1, P2} that are con-
nected by pair-wise private and authentic channels in a synchro-
nous network. The function f to be evaluated is expressed as a
circuit ckt over an arithmetic ring Z2ℓ , consisting of 2-input addi-
tion and multiplication gates. The topology of the circuit is assumed
to be publicly known. The term D denotes the multiplicative depth
of the circuit, while I,O,A,M denote the number of input wires,
output wires, addition gates and multiplication gates respectively
in ckt. We use the notation wx to denote a wire w with value x
flowing through it. We use g = (wx ,wy ,wz ) to denote a gate in
the ckt with left input wire wx , right input wire wy and output
wire wz . In our protocols, we divide P into disjoint sets {P0} and
{P1, P2}, where P0 acts as a “distributor" to do the “pre-processing"
during the offline phase, which is utilized by the “evaluators" P1, P2
to evaluate ckt during the online phase. We use the superscripts
“s" and “m" to distinguish the protocols in the semi-honest and
malicious setting respectively. The protocols over boolean ring Z21
can be obtained by replacing the arithmetic operations addition
(+) and multiplication (×) with XOR (⊕) and AND (·) respectively.
Below, we present the tools needed for our protocol.
2.1 Collision Resistant Hash
Consider a hash function family H = K × L → Y. The hash
function H is said to be collision resistant if for all probabilis-
tic polynomial-time adversaries A, given the description of Hk
where k ∈R K , there exists a negligible function negl() such that
Pr[(x1,x2) ← A(k) : (x1 , x2) ∧ Hk (x1) = Hk (x2)] ≤ negl(κ),
wherem = poly(κ) and x1,x2 ∈R {0, 1}m .
2.2 Shared Key Setup
To save communication between the parties, a one-time setup that
establishes pre-shared random keys for a pseudo-random function
(PRF) F is used. A similar setup has been used in the known proto-
cols in the 3PC setting [2, 33, 50]. Here F : 0, 1κ × 0, 1κ → X is a
secure PRF, with co-domain X being Z2ℓ . The set of keys are:
– One key shared between every pair– k01,k02,k12 for the parties
(P0, P1), (P0, P2), (P1, P2) respectively.
– One shared key amongst all– kP .
If parties P0, P1 wish to sample a random value r non-interactively,
they invoke Fk01 (id01) to obtain r , where id01 is a counter that the
parties update locally after every PRF invocation. The key used to
sample a value will be clear from the context (from the identities of
the pair that samples or from the fact that it is sampled by all) and
will be omitted. We model the key setup via a functionality Fsetup
that can be realized using any secure MPC protocol.
3 SHARING SEMANTICS
In this section, we explain two variants of secret sharing that are
used in this work. Both the variants operate over arithmetic (Z2ℓ )
and boolean (Z21 ) rings.
[·]-sharing. A value v is said to be [·]-shared among parties P1, P2,
if the parties P1 and P2 respectively holds the values v1 and v2 such
that v = v1 + v2. We use [·]Pi to denote the [·]-share of party Pi for
i ∈ {1, 2}.
⟦·⟧-sharing. A value v is said to be ⟦·⟧-shared among parties
P0, P1 and P2, if
– there exists values λv,mv such that v = mv − λv.
– P0 holds λv,1 and λv,2.
– P1 and P2 hold (mv, λv,1) and (mv, λv,2) respectively.
We denote ⟦·⟧-share of the parties as ⟦v⟧P0 = (λv,1, λv,2), ⟦v⟧P1 =
(mv, λv,1) and ⟦v⟧P2 = (mv, λv,2). We use ⟦v⟧ = (mv, [λv]) to denote
the ⟦·⟧-share of v.
Linearity of the secret sharing schemes. Given the [·]-sharing of
x ,y ∈ Z2ℓ and public constants c1, c2 ∈ Z2ℓ , parties can locally
compute [c1x + c2y]. To see this,
[c1x + c2y] = (c1x1 + c2y1, c1x2 + c2y2) = c1[x] + c2[y]
It is easy to see that the linearity trivially extends to ⟦·⟧-sharing
as well. That is, given the ⟦·⟧-sharing of x ,y and public constants
c1, c2, parties can locally compute ⟦c1x + c2y⟧.
⟦c1x + c2y⟧ = (c1mx + c2my , c1[λx ] + c2[λy ])
= c1⟦x⟧ + c2⟦y⟧
The linearity property enables parties to locally perform the opera-
tions such as addition and multiplication with a public constant.
4 OUR 3PC PROTOCOL
We start with our 3PC protocol Πs3pc that securely evaluates any
arithmetic circuit over Z2ℓ for ℓ ≥ 1, tolerating semi-honest adver-
saries.
4.1 3PC with semi-honest security
Our protocol Πs3pc has three stages– input-sharing, circuit-
evaluation, and output-reconstruction. During input-sharing stage,
each party generates a random ⟦·⟧-sharing of its input. During the
circuit-evaluation stage, the parties evaluate ckt in a ⟦·⟧-shared
fashion. During the output-reconstruction stage, the parties recon-
struct the ⟦·⟧-shared circuit outputs. All the stages (except output-
reconstruction) can be cast in the offline and online phase, where
steps independent of the actual inputs can be executed in the of-
fline phase. At a high level, the [·]-sharing needed behind every
⟦·⟧-shared value in the online phase is precomputed, while the
⟦·⟧-sharing of values themselves are computed in the online phase.
We distinguish these steps as Offline and Online steps respectively.
While the Offline steps are executed only by the distributor P0, the
Online steps are executed only by the evaluators P1 and P2. We now
individually elaborate on each of the stages.
Input-sharing Stage. Protocol ΠsSh(Pi ,x) (Figure 1) allows party
Pi ∈ P, the designated party to give input x ∈ Z2ℓ to wire wx , to⟦·⟧-share its input. In the offline step, parties locally sample λx,1
and λx,2 using their shared randomness such that parties P0 and
Pi learns the entire λx . In the online step, Pi computes mx using
λx and sends it to the evaluators.
Offline:
– If Pi = P0, parties P0, Pj for j ∈ {1, 2} locally sample a random
λx, j ∈ Z2ℓ .
– If Pi = P1, parties P0, P1 sample a random λx,1 ∈ Z2ℓ while all the
parties in P sample a random λx,2.
– If Pi = P2, parties P0, P2 sample a random λx,2 ∈ Z2ℓ while all the
parties in P sample a random λx,1.
Online: Pi sendsmx = x + λx to every Pj for j ∈ {1, 2} who then sets
⟦x⟧Pj = (mx , λx, j ).
Figure 1: Protocol ΠsSh(Pi ,x)
Circuit-evaluation Stage. Here parties evaluate each gate g in the
ckt in the topological order, where they maintain the invariant that
given inputs of g in ⟦·⟧-shared fashion, parties generate ⟦·⟧-sharing
for the output of g. If g is an addition gate (wx ,wy ,wz ), then this is
done locally using the linearity of ⟦·⟧-sharing, as per the protocol
ΠAdd (Figure 2).
Offline: P0, P1 set λz,1 = λx,1 + λy,1, while P0, P2 set λz,2 = λx,2 +
λy,2.
Online: P1 and P2 set mz = mx +my .
Figure 2: Protocol ΠAdd(wx ,wy ,wz )
If g = (wx ,wy ,wz ) is a multiplication gate, then given ⟦x⟧ =
(mx , [λx ]) and ⟦y⟧ = (my , [λy ]), the parties compute ⟦z⟧ by run-
ning the protocol ΠsMul (Figure 3). During the offline phase, parties
generate λz for the gate output. In addition, P0 also [·]-shares the
product of the masks of the gate inputs (λxλy ), both of which are
known to P0 as a part of ⟦x⟧P0 and ⟦y⟧P0 . Online phase is exe-
cuted by {P1, P2}, where they locally generate [mz ], followed by
reconstructing mz .
Offline:
– P0 and P1 locally sample random λz,1, γxy,1 ∈ Z2ℓ , while P0 and P2
locally sample a random λz,2 .
– P0 computes γxy = λx λy and sends γxy,2 = γxy − γxy,1 to P2.
Online:
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2} locally computes [mz ]Pi = (i − 1)mxmy −
mx [λy ]Pi −my [λx ]Pi + [λz ]Pi + [γxy ]Pi .
– P1, P2 mutually exchange their shares and reconstruct mz .
Figure 3: Protocol ΠsMul(wx ,wy ,wz )
Output-reconstruction Stage. To reconstruct the output from
⟦y⟧, we observe that the missing share of party Pi , for i ∈ {0, 1, 2},
is held by the other two parties. Thus, one among the other two
parties can send the missing share to Pi , who then computes the
output as y = my − λy,1 − λy,2. We call the resultant protocol as
ΠsRec.
We combine the aforementioned stages and present Πs3pc in
Figure 4.
Pre-processing (Offline Phase):
– Input wires: For j = 1, . . . , I, corresponding to the circuit-input x j ,
parties execute the offline steps of the instance ΠsSh(Pi , x j ).
– For each gate g in ckt in the topological order, execute the offline steps
of the instance ΠsMul(wx j , wy j , wz j ) if g is the jth multiplication
gate where j ∈ {1, . . . ,M} or respectively the offline steps of the
instance ΠAdd(wx j , wy j , wz j ) if g is the jth addition gate where
j ∈ {1, . . . , A}.
Circuit Evaluation (Online Phase):
– Sharing Circuit-input Values: For j = 1, . . . , I, corresponding to the
circuit-input x j , party Pi executes the online steps of the instance
ΠsSh(Pi , x j ), where Pi is the party designated to provide x j .
– Gate Evaluation: For each gate g in ckt in the topological order, P1, P2
execute the online steps of the instance ΠsMul(wx j , wy j , wz j ) if g is
the jth multiplication gate where j ∈ {1, . . . ,M} or respectively
the online steps of the instance ΠAdd(wx j , wy j , wz j ) if g is the jth
addition gate where j ∈ {1, . . . , A}.
– Output Reconstruction: Let ⟦y1⟧, . . . , ⟦yO⟧ be the shared function
outputs, where for j = 1, . . . , O, we have ⟦yj⟧P0 = [λyj ], ⟦yj⟧P1 =
(myj , [λyj ]P1 ) and ⟦yj⟧P2 = (myj , [λyj ]P2 ). The parties in P recon-
struct yj by executing the instance ΠsRec(⟦yj⟧, P).
Figure 4: The semi-honest 3PC protocol Πs3pc
Correctness and Security. We prove correctness and argue secu-
rity informally below.
Theorem 4.1 (Correctness). Protocol Πs3pc is correct.
Proof. We claim that for every wire in ckt, the parties hold a
⟦·⟧-sharing of the wire value in Πs3pc. The correctness then follows
from the fact that for the circuit-output wires, the corresponding
⟦·⟧-sharing is reconstructed correctly. The claim for circuit-input
wires follows from ΠsSh, while for addition gates it follows from the
linearity of ⟦·⟧-sharing. Consider amultiplication gate (wx ,wy ,wz ),
evaluated as per ΠsMul, where mx = x + λx , my = y + λy and
γxy = λxλy . We argue that mz as computed in online step of ΠsMul
results in xy + λz and hence at the end of ΠsMul, the parties hold⟦z⟧. This is because mz = mxmy − mxλy − myλx + λz + γxy =
(mx − λx )(my − λy ) + λz = xy + λz . The linearity of [·]-sharing
implies that P1 and P2 correctly compute a [·]-sharing of mz . □
The security is argued as follows. If P0 is corrupt, then the secu-
rity follows since P0 never sees the masked values over the inter-
mediate wires. If one of the evaluators is corrupt, then the security
holds since the corrupt evaluator knows only one of the shares of
the mask while the other share is picked at random. The detailed
security proof appear in Appendix B where we show our protocol
emulates the functionality F3pc for computing a 3-party function f
in the semi-honest setting as given in Figure 5.
F3pc interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S and is parame-
terized by a 3-ary function f , represented by a publicly known arithmetic
circuit ckt over Z2ℓ .
Upon receiving the input x1, . . . , xI from the respective parties in P,
where each xi ∈ Z2ℓ , the functionality computes (y1, . . . , yO) = f (x1,
. . . , xI) and sends y1, . . . , yO to the parties in P.
Figure 5: Functionality F3pc
Theorem 4.2. Πs3pc requires one round with communication of
M ring elements during the offline phase. In the online phase, Πs3pc
requires one round with communication of at most 2I ring elements in
the Input-sharing stage,D rounds with communication of 2M ring ele-
ments for circuit-evaluation stage and one round with communication
of 3O elements for the output-reconstruction stage.
Proof. During the offline phase, the [·]-shares of every λ are
generated non-interactively. For the multiplication gates, generat-
ing [·]-sharing ofγxy values requires one round and communication
ofM elements. During the online phase, generating the ⟦·⟧-sharing
of circuit-inputs requires one round. For each input of P0, generat-
ing the ⟦·⟧-sharing requires a communication of 2 elements, while
the same for P1/P2 requires one element. So, the Input-sharing
phase needs one round and communication of at most 2I elements.
Evaluating the addition gates is free, while the same for each multi-
plication gate requires one round and communication of 2 elements
to reconstruct the mz value. Hence the circuit-evaluation phase
needs D rounds and communication of 2M elements. Reconstruct-
ing the circuit-outputs require one round and communication of
3O elements. □
4.2 3PC with malicious security
In this section, we describe our maliciously secure 3PC protocol
Πm3pc that securely evaluates any arithmetic circuit over Z2ℓ . Similar
to Πs3pc, protocol Π
m
3pc has three stages– input-sharing, circuit-
evaluation and output-reconstruction.
Input Sharing and Output Reconstruction Stages. We begin with
the sharing and reconstruction protocols in the malicious setting,
which can readily replace ΠsSh and Π
s
Rec in Π
m
3pc to help obtain
maliciously-secure input sharing and output reconstruction stage.
In the malicious setting, we need to ensure that the shares pos-
sessed by the honest parties are consistent. By consistent shares,
we mean that the common share possessed by the honest parties
should be the same. In protocol ΠsSh, the λ-shares will be consis-
tent since they are generated non-interactively. But, if a corrupt P0
owns a value x and wants to create an inconsistent ⟦x⟧-sharing,
he can send two different versions of mx to P1 and P2. To detect
this inconsistency, P1, P2 exchange H(mx ) and abort if there is a
mismatch. The parties can exchange a combined hash for all the
wires where P0 is the owner and thus the cost reduces to two hash
values in the amortized sense. We call the resultant protocol as ΠmSh.
For reconstruction, let ⟦y⟧ be a sharing to be reconstructedwhere
⟦y⟧P0 = (λy,1, λy,2), ⟦y⟧P1 = (m′y , λ′y,1) and ⟦y⟧P2 = (m′′y , λ′y,2)
(the distinction in the notation is done to differentiate the shares
held by each party). Protocol ΠmRec(⟦y⟧,P) (Figure 6) enables each
honest party in P to either compute y or output ⊥.
Online:
– P0 and P2 send λy,2 and H(λ′y,2) respectively to P1.
– P0 and P1 send λy,1 and H(λ′y,1) respectively to P2.
– P1 and P2 send m′y and H(m′′y ) respectively to P0.
Pi for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} abort if the received values mismatch. Else Pi sets
y = my − λy,1 − λy,2.
Figure 6: Protocol ΠmRec(⟦y⟧,P)
Now the input sharing and output reconstruction stages in Πm3pc are
similar to those in Πs3pc apart from protocols Π
s
Sh and Π
s
Rec being
replaced with ΠmSh and Π
m
Rec respectively.
Circuit Evaluation Stage. Protocol ΠAdd remains secure in the
malicious setting as well since it involves local operations only. The
challenge lies in turning the multiplication protocol ΠsMul to one
that tolerates malicious behaviour. We start with the observation
that ΠsMul suffers in two mutually-exclusive ways in the face of
one malicious corruption, each under different corruption scenario.
When P0 is corrupt, the only possible violation in ΠsMul comes in
the form of sharing γxy , λxλy during the offline phase. When
P1 (or P2) is corrupt, the violation occurs when a wrong share of
mz is handed over to the fellow honest evaluator during the online
phase, causing reconstruction of a wrong mz . While the attacks
are quite distinct in nature following the asymmetric roles played
by the two sets {P0} and {P1, P2} in ΠsMul, our novel construction
solves both issues at the same time via checking product-relation
of a single ⟦·⟧-shared triple. We start with the technique to tackle a
corrupt evaluator (P1 or P2) during the online phase. To identify if
an incorrect mz is reconstructed by an honest evaluator, say P1, he
can seek the help of P0 as follows: P1 can send mx ,my to P0, who
can then compute mz , as P0 already has knowledge of λx , λy and
λz from the offline phase and send back to P1. Note that sending
mx ,my in clear to P0 breaks privacy of the scheme and hence P1
sends padded version of the same to P0, namelym⋆x = mx +δx and
m⋆y = my +δy . P0 then computesm⋆z = −m⋆x λy −m⋆y λx +λz+2γxy .
Note that,
m∗z = −m⋆x λy −m⋆y λx + λz + 2γxy
= −(mx + δx )λy − (my + δy )λx + λz + 2γxy
= (mz −mxmy ) − (δxλy + δyλx − γxy )
= (mz −mxmy ) − χ
Assuming that P0 knows χ = δxλy + δyλx − γxy , he can then
compute m∗z + χ and send it back to P1. Given the knowledge
of mx ,my , P1 can verify the correctness of mz . The case for a
honest P2 follows similarly. Now we describe how to enable P0
obtain χ = δxλy + δyλx − γxy . First of all, note that revealing
χ in clear to P0 leads to breach of privacy. Because, P0 knows
λx , λy ,γxy from the offline phase and he receivesmx +δx ,my +δy
during the online phase. With this information, P0 can deduce a
relation between mx and my . Hence, we tweak the value of χ
to δxλy + δyλx + δz − γxy incorporating a random mask δz . To
generate χ , in the offline phase, parties P1, P2 locally sample random
elements δx ,δy ,δz ∈ Z2ℓ , compute a [·]-sharing of χ and sends
the shares to P0. Let [χ ]Pi = χi for i ∈ {1, 2}. P0 locally adds the
[·]-shares and obtains χ . In the above step, a corrupt evaluator can
introduce an error while computing the [·]-share of χ , affecting
the correctness of the protocol. Thus, it is crucial to ensure the
correctness of χ computed by P0.
To summarize, we now have two issues to tackle in the offline
phase– (i) as we pointed out earlier, during the offline phase, a
corrupt P0 can incorrectly share γxy ; (ii) a corrupt evaluator can
send a wrong [·]-share of χ to P0. Towards tackling these, once P0
obtains the value χ , parties locally compute ⟦·⟧-shares of values
a = δx − λx , b = δy − λy and c = (δz + δxδy ) − χ as follows:
⟦a⟧P0 = (λx,1, λx,2), ⟦b⟧P0 = (λy,1, λy,2), ⟦c⟧P0 = (χ1, χ2)⟦a⟧P1 = (δx , λx,1), ⟦b⟧P1 = (δy , λy,1), ⟦c⟧P1 = (δz + δxδy , χ1)⟦a⟧P2 = (δx , λx,2) ⟦b⟧P2 = (δy , λy,2) ⟦c⟧P2 = (δz + δxδy , χ2)
Now (⟦a⟧, ⟦b⟧, ⟦c⟧) is a multiplication triple (c = ab) if and only if
P0 shares γxy correctly (when it is corrupt) and P0 reconstructs χ
correctly (when one of the evaluators is corrupt). This is because,
ab = (δx − λx )(δy − λy ) = δxδy + λxλy − δxλy − δyλx
= (δxδy + δz ) − (δxλy + δyλx + δz − γxy )
= (δxδy + δz ) − χ = c
We first recall the two standard components needed to check the
validity of a multiplication triple– i) a tool for generating ⟦·⟧-shared
random multiplication triple and ii) a technique to check securely
the product relation of a ⟦·⟧-shared triple, given a valid ⟦·⟧-shared
multiplication triple (often referred to as sacrificing technique).
With a lot of constructions specifically available for the former one
[2, 33], we choose to model it as an ideal functionality Ftrip and
use it for our purpose without going into the details. For the latter
component, we quickly recall the known protocol.
– Parties locally compute ⟦ρ⟧ = ⟦a⟧ − ⟦d⟧ and ⟦σ ⟧ = ⟦b⟧ − ⟦e⟧.
– Parties reconstruct ρ and σ by executing ΠmRec(⟦ρ⟧, P) and
ΠmRec(⟦σ ⟧, P) respectively.
– Parties locally compute ⟦τ ⟧ = ⟦c⟧ − ⟦f⟧ − σ ⟦d⟧ − ρ⟦e⟧ − σ ρ .
– Parties reconstruct τ by executing ΠmRec(⟦τ ⟧, P) and output ⊥, if
τ , 0.
Figure 7: Protocol Πprc to check product-relation of a triple
Ftrip, by now a standard functionality [2, 33], allows to generate
a set of ⟦·⟧-sharing of multiplication triples over P, each of which,
say (d, e, f) satisfies the following– i) d, e and f are random and
private and ii) f = de. In Appendix A.1, we present an instantiation
of this functionality, namely Πtrip (Figure 18), using the techniques
proposed by [2, 33].
Protocol Πprc [20, 33] (‘prc’ stands for product-relation check)
takes a pair of ⟦·⟧-shared random and private triples as input, say
(a, b, c) and (d, e, f), over Z2ℓ , verifies if the former is a multiplica-
tion triple or not and nothing beyond, given the latter is a valid
triple. The protocol appears in Figure 7 and its properties in Ap-
pendix A.2.
By exploiting the definition of ⟦·⟧-sharing, we reduce the cost of
Πprc to just 2, instead of 3, instances of ΠmRec, in an amortized sense.
Recall that the goal of the third invocation of ΠmRec inside Πprc is
to reconstruct ⟦τ⟧ = (mτ , [λτ ]), followed by checking if τ = 0. It
follows that τ = 0 if and only if mτ − λτ = 0 implying mτ = λτ .
Hence checking τ = 0 is equivalent to checking ifmτ = λτ ,1 +λτ ,2,
which can be translated to three pair-wise checks – (i) P0 and P1 can
verify ifmτ−λτ ,1 ?= λτ ,2; (ii) P1 and P2 can verify ifmτ−λτ ,2 ?= λτ ,1;
(iii) P0 and P2 can verify if mτ − λτ ,2 ?= λτ ,1. Parties in P can
mutually perform the above checks for all the instances of Πprc
together at the end by exchanging hash of all the required values.
Offline :
– Parties P0, P1 locally sample random λz,1, γxy,1 ∈ Z2ℓ , while P0, P2
locally sample a random λz,2. P0 locally computes γxy = λx λy and
sends γxy,2 = γxy − γxy,1 to P2.
– Parties execute Πtrip to generate triple (⟦d⟧, ⟦e⟧, ⟦f⟧).
– Parties P1, P2 locally sample random δx , δy, δz ∈ Z2ℓ and compute
[δz ] non-interactively.
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2} computes [χ ]Pi = δx [λy ]Pi + δy [λx ]Pi + [δz ]Pi −
[γxy ]Pi and sends [χ ]Pi to P0, who computes χ .
– Parties locally compute the ⟦·⟧-shares of the values a = δx − λx , b =
δy − λy and c = (δz + δxδy ) − χ .
– Parties execute Πprc on (⟦a⟧, ⟦b⟧, ⟦c⟧) and (⟦d⟧, ⟦e⟧, ⟦f⟧).
Online :
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2} locally computes [mz ]Pi = (i − 1)mxmy −
mx [λy ]Pi −my [λx ]Pi + [λz ]Pi + [γxy ]Pi . P1, P2 mutually exchange
their shares and reconstruct mz .
– P1 sends m⋆x = mx + δx , m⋆y = my + δy to P0, while P2 sends
H(m⋆x | |m⋆y ) to P0. P0 outputs⊥, if the received values are inconsistent.
– P0 computes m⋆z = −m⋆x λy − m⋆y λx + λz + 2γxy + χ and sends
H(m⋆z ) to both P1 and P2.
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2} abort if H(m⋆z ) , H(mz −mxmy + δz ).
Figure 8: Protocol ΠmMul(wx ,wy ,wz ):
With the building blocks set, we present our maliciously-secure
multiplication protocol ΠmMul in Figure 8. Note that the use of hash
function improves the amortized cost in the online phase of ΠmMul–
(i) P2 can send a single hash of all the m⋆x and m⋆y values for all
the instances of ΠmMul to P0 in the end of the circuit-evaluation; (ii)
P0 can send a single hash of all the m⋆z values for all the instances
of ΠmMul to the evaluators at the end of the circuit-evaluation. The
former step can be coupled with the communication of (m⋆x ,m⋆y )
by P1 to P0. Party P1 sending to P0 attributes to the increase of the
communication cost per multiplication gate in the malicious setting,
compared to the semi-honest setting. On the positive note, coupling
the above communication for all the multiplication gates together
results in a couple of rounds overhead compared to the semi-honest
protocol. As a consequence, the latency of the malicious protocol
remains as good as the semi-honest protocol.
The correctness of the protocol ΠmMul is stated in Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.3 (Correctness). In the protocol ΠmMul, the following
holds: During the offline phase, if P0 is corrupt and [·]-shares γxy ,
λxλy , then the honest evaluators output ⊥. On the other hand, if one
of the evaluators is corrupt and enforces the honest P0 to obtain an
incorrect χ , then the honest parties output ⊥. During the online step,
if one of the evaluators is corrupt and enforces the honest evaluator
to obtain an incorrect mz , then the honest evaluator outputs ⊥
Proof. For correctness, first consider the case when P0 is corrupt
and [·]-shares γxy , λxλy during offline step. Let γxy = λxλy + ∆
where ∆ is the error introduced by P0. Now,
c = (δxδy + δz ) − (δxλy + δyλx + δz − (γxy − ∆))
= (δx − λx )(δy − λy ) − ∆ = a − ∆ , a
and thus (a, b, c) is not a multiplication triple. Then, from
Lemma A.1, honest evaluators output ⊥.
Second, we consider the case when one of the evaluators, say P1,
sends χ1 + ∆ to P0 who reconstructs χ ′ = χ + ∆. Then, the value
c = (δxδy + δz ) − χ ′ = (δxδy + δz ) − (χ + ∆)
= (δxδy + δz ) − (δxλy + δyλx + δz − γxy ) − ∆
= (δx − λx )(δy − λy ) − ∆ = a − ∆ , a
and hence (a, b, c) is not a multiplication triple. Thus, similar to the
previous case, honest parties output ⊥.
Lastly, we consider the case, when one of the evaluators, say P1, is
corrupt and during online step sends [mz ]P1+∆ for some non-zero∆
during the reconstruction, so that P2 reconstructsmz +∆, instead of
mz . In this case, the honest P0 would have χ = δxλy+δyλx+δz−γxy
from offline step. Moreover, during online step, P0 correctly learns
m⋆x = mx +δx andm⋆y = my +δy . Furthermore, γxy = λxλy holds.
It then follows that m⋆z received by P2 from P0 will be different
from mz + ∆ −mxmy + δz locally computed by P2 and hence P2
will output ⊥. □
The informal privacy argument of ΠmMul is as follows. We first
consider the case when P0 is corrupt, where ⟦x⟧, ⟦y⟧ and ⟦z⟧ are
defined by the shares of P1, P2. The privacy for this case follows
from the fact that P0 does not learn anything aboutmx ,my andmz ,
neither during the offline step, nor during the online step. Clearly,
the communication between P0 and P1, P2 during offline step is
independent of mx ,my and mz . Moreover, the value χ reveals
nothing about δx and δx since it is paddedwith a random δz . During
the online step, P0 learnsm⋆x andm⋆y , which reveals nothing about
mx ,my , as δx and δy remains random and private for P0. We next
consider the case when one of the evaluators, say P1 is corrupt. The
privacy for this case follows from the fact that λx , λy , λz and γxy
remains private from the view point of P1. On the other hand, no
additional information is revealed from m⋆z during the online step,
as adversary will already know that m⋆z = mz −mxmy + δz .
We present a detailed security proof for our 3PC protocol Πm3pc
in Appendix C, showing that it emulates the functionality F Abort3pc
as given in Figure 9.
FAbort3pc interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S and is parame-
terized by a 3-ary function f , represented by a publicly known arithmetic
circuit ckt over Z2ℓ .
Input: Upon receiving the input x, . . . , xI from the respective parties
in P, do the following: if (Input, ∗) message was received from Pj cor-
responding to x j , then ignore. Otherwise record x ′j = x j internally. If
x ′j , Z2ℓ , consider x
′
j = abort.
Output to adversary: If there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , I} such that x ′j =
abort, send (Output, ⊥) to all the parties. Else, send (Output, (y1, . . . ,
yO)) to the adversary S, where (y1, . . . , yO) = f (x ′1, . . . , x ′I ).
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I }) from adver-
sary S, where {I } denotes a subset of the honest parties. If an honest
party belongs to I , send (Output, ⊥), else send (Output, (y1, . . . , yO)).
Figure 9: Functionality F Abort3pc
We now prove the communication complexity of protocol Πm3pc
below.
Theorem 4.4. Protocol Πm3pc has the following complexities.
Input-sharing Stage: It is non-interactive during the offline phase
and requires one round and an amortized communication of at most
2I ring elements during the online phase.
Circuit-evaluation Stage: Assuming M = 220 and a statistical
security parameter s = 40, in the amortized sense, evaluating each
multiplication gate requires 4 rounds and communication of 21
ring elements in the offline phase, while the online phase needs 1
round with a communication of 4 ring elements.
Output-reconstruction Stage: It requires one round and an
amortized communication of 3O ring elements.
Proof. The complexity for the Input-sharing Stage follows from
Theorem 4.2 and the fact that the cost of ΠmSh reduces to that of Π
s
Sh
in an amortized sense due to the use of the hash function. During
the circuit-evaluation stage, the addition gates need no interac-
tion, as usual. For a multiplication gate, the offline communication
include– (i) sending a share of [γxy ] to P2; (ii) the amortized cost of
generating one shared triple via Ftrip; (iii) the cost of reconstruct-
ing χ towards P0 and lastly (iv) the cost of one Πprc. The first one
requires one round and communication of one element. The second
one requires 3 rounds and an amortized communication of 9B − 6
ring elements, where B = slog2 M , using the techniques of [2] (see
Appendix A.1), where s is the statistical parameter dictating the
performance of underlying cut-and-choose technique. Assuming
M = 220, s = 40, this ensures that generating a single multiplication
triple require 3 rounds and an amortized communication of 12 ring
elements. The third one requires one round and communication
of two elements. The fourth and last one requires one round and
an amortized communication of 6 elements as part of the two un-
derlying instances of ΠmRec. This sums up to communication of 21
elements per multiplication gate.
The total number of rounds for evaluating the multiplication
gates during the offline phase turns to be 4 as follows: P0 can
send the share of [γxy ] to P2 and in parallel, the parties can start
generating a shared triple via Ftrip; while the former requires one
round, the latter requires three rounds. Once the share of [γxy ] is
available with P2, party P1 and P2 can reconstruct χ towards P0,
requiring one round, which overlaps with the second round of the
instantiation of Ftrip. Once the third round of the instantiation of
Ftrip is over, the parties execute the instance of Πprc, which requires
one additional round.
During the online phase, evaluating a multiplication gate re-
quires one round and communication of two elements for the re-
construction ofmz . Also, P1 needs to sendm⋆x andm⋆y values to P0
per instance, which requires just one round for all the multiplication
gates and communication of 2 ring elements per gate. Summing
up, evaluating a multiplication gate in the online phase requires an
amortized round complexity of 1 and communication of 4 elements.
The output-reconstruction phase requires one round and an
amortized communication of 3O elements, as the cost of ΠmRec re-
duces to ΠsRec in an amortized sense due to the use of the hash
function. □
4.3 Achieving Fairness
We boost the security of Πm3pc from abort to fairness via a fair
reconstruction protocol ΠfRec that substitutes ΠmRec for the recon-
struction of the circuit outputs. To fairly reconstruct ⟦y⟧, the pair
{P0, P1} commit their common share λy,1 to P2 and likewise the
pair P0, P2 commit their common share λy,2 to P1 in the offline
phase. In the online phase, the evaluator pair {P1, P2} commit their
common information my to P0. In all the three cases, shared ran-
dom (PRF) key is used to derive the randomness for preparing the
commitments. As a result, each pair should prepare an identical
commitment ideally. The recipient in each case can abort when
the received commitments do not match. If no abort happens, P0
signals P1 and P2 to start opening the commitments which will help
the parties to get their missing share and reconstruct the output.
As there is at least one honest party in each pair of (P0, P1), (P0, P2)
and (P1, P2), the opened value of the honest party from each pair is
used for reconstructing y. Lastly, if the protocol aborts before, then
none receive the output maintaining fairness.
A very subtle issue arises in the above protocol in the absence of
broadcast channel. A corrupt P0 can send distinct signals to P1 and
P2 (abort to one and continue to the other), breaching unanimity
in the end. To settle this, we make the pair {P0, P1} to commit
a value r1 chosen from their common random source to P2 and
likewise the pair P0, P2 to commit a common value r2 to P1 in the
offline phase. In the online phase, when P0 signals abort to P1, it
sends the opening of r2 along. Similarly, when P0 signals abort
to P2, it sends the opening of r1 along. Now an evaluator, say P1
on receiving the abort can convince P2 that it has indeed received
abort from P0, using r2 as the proof of origin for the abort message.
Because the only way P1 can secure r2 is via P0. Put differently, a
corrupt P1 cannot simply claim that it received abort from P0, while
P0 is really instructed to continue. A single pair of (r1, r2) can be
used as a proof of origin for multiple instances of reconstruction
running in parallel. Protocol ΠfRec(⟦y⟧,P) is formally presented in
Figure 10.
Offline:
– Parties P0, P1 locally sample a random r1 ∈ Z2ℓ , prepare and send
commitments of λy,1 and r1 to P2. Similarly, parties P0, P2 sample r2
and send commitments of λy,2 and r2 to P1 The randomness needed
for both commitments are sampled from the PRF key-setup.
– P1 (resp. P2) aborts if the received commitments mismatch.
Online:
– P1, P2 compute a commitment ofmy using randomness sampled from
their PRF key-setup and send it to P0.
– If the commitments do not match, P0 sends (abort, o1) to P2, while
he sends (abort, o2) to P1 and aborts, where oi denotes opening
information for the commitment of ri . Else P0 sends continue to
both P1 and P2.
– P1, P2 exchange the messages received from P0.
– P1 aborts if he receives either (i) (abort, o2) from P0 and o2 opens
the commitment of r2 or (ii) (abort, o1) from P2 and o1 is the correct
opening information of r1. The case for P2 is similar to that of P1
– If no abort happens, parties obtain their missing share of a as fol-
lows:
– P0, P1 open λy,1 towards P2.
– P0, P2 open λy,2 towards P1.
– P1, P2 open my towards P0.
– Parties reconstruct the value y using missing share that matches with
the agreed upon commitment.
Figure 10: Protocol ΠfRec(⟦y⟧,P)
The complexity of ΠfRec is stated below. The commitment can
be implemented via a hash function H() e.g. (c,o) = (H(x | |r ),
x | |r ) = Com(x ; r ), whose security can be proved in the random-
oracle model (ROM) [40]. We do not include the cost of commitment
and opening of r1 and r2, as they will get amortized away over many
instances of ΠfRec.
Lemma 4.5. Protocol ΠfRec requires one round and an amortized
communication of 4 commitments in the offline phase. ΠfRec requires
four rounds and an amortized communication of at most 2 commit-
ments and 6 opening of commitments in the online phase.
5 PRIVACY PRESERVING MACHINE
LEARNING
We apply our techniques for 3PC developed so far to the regime of
ML prediction for a range of prediction functions– linear regres-
sion, logistic regression, linear SVM classification, and linear SVM
regression.
5.1 The Model
A model-owner M, holding a vector of trained model parameters,
would like to offer ML prediction service to a client C holding a
query vector as per certain prediction function. In the server-aided
setting, M and C outsource their respective inputs in shared fash-
ion to three untrusted but non-colluding servers {P0, P1, P2} who
perform the computation in shared fashion via techniques devel-
oped for our 3PC protocols and reconstruct the output to the client
alone. The client learns the output and nothing beyond. We as-
sume a computationally bounded adversary A, who can corrupt
at most one of the servers {P0, P1, P2} and one of {M, C} in either
semi-honest or malicious fashion. The security against an A cor-
rupting parties in both sets {P0, P1, P2} and {M, C} semi-honestly
and likewise maliciously reduces to the semi-honest and respec-
tively malicious security of our 3PC protocols. Adversarial machine
learning [56, 57, 62] that includes attacks launched by a client to
learn the model using its outputs, lies outside the scope of this
work. Following the existing literature on server-aided secure ML
[34, 39, 53, 54], we do not count the cost of M and C making their
inputs available in secret-shared form amongst the servers and the
cost of reconstructing the output to the client. We assume that the
inputs are available to the servers in a secret-shared form and focus
on efficient computation of a prediction function on the shared
inputs to obtain shared outputs.
5.2 Notations
For a vector ®a, ai denotes the ith element in the vector. For two vec-
tors ®a and ®b of length d , their scalar dot product is ®a⊙®b = ∑di=1 aibi .
The definitions of [·]-sharing and ⟦·⟧-sharing are extended in a nat-
ural way for the vectors. A vector ®a = (a1, . . . , ad ) is said to be [·]-
shared, denoted as [®a], if each ai is [·]-shared. We use the notations
[®a]P1 and [®a]P2 to denote the vector of [·]-shares of P1 and P2 re-
spectively, corresponding to [®a]. Similarly, a vector ®a = (a1, . . . , ad )
is said to be ⟦·⟧-shared, denoted as ⟦®a⟧, if each ai is ⟦·⟧-shared.
We use the notation
−→
λa and −→ma to denote the vector of masks and
vector of masked values corresponding to ⟦®a⟧. Finally, we note that
the linearity of [·] and ⟦·⟧-sharings hold even over vectors.
5.3 Fixed Point Arithmetic
We represent decimal values as ℓ-bit integers in signed 2’s com-
plement representation with the most significant bit representing
the sign bit and x least significant bits representing the fractional
part. For our purpose, we choose ℓ = 64 and x = 13, keeping
i = ℓ − x − 1 = 50 bits for the integral part of the value. We
then treat these ℓ-bit strings as elements of Z2ℓ . A product of two
numbers from this domain would lead to expanding x to 26 and
yet leaving 37 bits for the integer part which keeps the accuracy
unaffected. As the prediction functions of our concern require mul-
tiplication of depth one, the prediction function output values have
the above format. Noticeably, since SecureML [52] and ABY3 [50]
need to do multiplication in sequence multiple times for the task
of training, they propose a new method of truncation to maintain
a representation invariant across the sequential products. This is
necessary to keep accuracy in check in their works.
5.4 Protocols for ML
We begin with some of the building blocks required.
Secure Dot Product. Given the ⟦·⟧-shares of d element vectors ®p
and ®q, the goal of a secure dot-product is to compute ⟦·⟧-sharing
of ®p ⊙ ®q. Using ΠMul naively to compute the product of each com-
ponent would require a communication complexity that is linearly
dependent on d in both the offline and online phase. In the semi-
honest setting, following the literature [17, 23, 29, 50, 59], we make
the communication of Πdp independent of d as follows: during the
offline phase, P0 [·]-shares only γpq = −→λp ⊙ −→λq , instead of each
individual λpi λqi . During the online phase, instead of reconstruct-
ing each mpiqi separately to compute mu where u = ®p ⊙ ®q, the
evaluators P1, P2 locally compute [mu] and then reconstruct mu.
We call the resultant protocol as Πsdp (Figure 11).
Offline : P0, P1 sample random λu,1, γpq,1 ∈ Z2ℓ , while P0, P2 sample
random λu,2 ∈ Z2ℓ . P0 locally computes γpq =
−→
λp ⊙ −→λq , sets γpq,2 =
γpq − γpq,1 and sends γpq,2 to P2.
Online :
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2} locally computes [mu]Pi =
∑d
j=1
((i − 1)mpjmqj −
mpj [λpj ]Pi −mqj [λpj ]Pi
)
+ [γpq]Pi + [λu]Pi .
– P1 and P2 mutually exchange [mu] to reconstruct mu.
Figure 11: Protocol Πsdp
Due to the extra checks we introduce for tolerating a maliciously
adversary in our multiplication protocol, the optimization done
above for semi-honest protocol in the offline phase does not work.
As a result, we resort to d invocations of our multiplication protocol.
Invoking Theorem 4.4, our protocol for dot product then needs to
communicate 21d ring elements in the offline phase. However, we
improve the online cost from 4d (as per Theorem 4.4) to 2d + 2 as
follows. The parties execute the online stage of protocol Πsdp. In
parallel, P1 sends m⋆pi ,m
⋆
qi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,d} to P0, while P2 sends
the corresponding hash to P0. Instead of sending m⋆piqi for each
piqi , P0 can “combine" all the m⋆piqi values and send a single m
⋆
u
to P1, P2 for verification. In detail, P0 can compute m⋆u =
∑d
j=1 m
⋆
uj
and send a hash of the same to both P1 and P2, who can then cross
check with a hash ofmu−∑dj=1(mpjmqj −δuj ). We call the resultant
protocol as Πmdp and the communication complexity is given below.
Lemma 5.1. Πsdp requires communication of one ring element dur-
ing the offline step and communication of two ring elements in online
step. Πmdp requires communication of 21d ring elements during the
offline step and communication of 2d + 2 ring elements in online step.
Secure Comparison. Comparing two arithmetic values is one of
the major hurdles in realizing efficient secure ML algorithms. Given
arithmetic shares ⟦u⟧, ⟦v⟧, parties wish to check whether u < v,
which is equivalent to checking if a < 0, where a = u−v. In the fixed-
point arithmetic representation, this task can be accomplished by
checking the msb(a). Thus the goal reduces to generating boolean-
shares ofmsb(a) given the arithmetic-sharing ⟦a⟧. Here, we exploit
the asymmetry in our secret sharing scheme and forgo expensive
primitives such as garbled circuits or parallel prefix adders, which
are used in SecureML [52] and ABY3 [50].
Offline: P1, P2 together sample random r, r′ ∈ Z2ℓ and set p = msb(r).
Parties non-interactively generate boolean shares of p as ⟦p⟧BP0 = (0, 0),⟦p⟧P1 = (p, 0) and ⟦p⟧P2 = (p, 0).
Online: P1 sets [a]P1 = ma − λa,1, P2 sets [a]P2 = −λa,2.
– P1 sends [ra]P1 = r[a]P1 + r′ to P0, while P2 sends [ra]P2 = r[a]P2 − r′
to P0, who adds them to obtain ra.
– P0 executes ΠsSh(P0, q) to generate ⟦q⟧ where q = msb(ra).
– Parties locally compute ⟦msb(a)⟧B = ⟦p⟧B⊕ ⟦q⟧B.
Figure 12: Protocol ΠsBitExt(⟦a⟧,P)
We observe that in the signed 2’s complement representation,
if we multiply two values, then the sign of the result is the sign
of the underlying product. Consequently, if a value a is multiplied
with r, then sign(a · r) = sign(a) ⊕ sign(r). On a high level, the semi-
honest protocol (Figure 12) proceeds as follows: P1, P2 reconstruct
ra towards P0 where a is the value we need the sign of, and r is a
random value sampled by P1, P2 together. P0 in turn boolean-shares
the sign of ra. Parties retrieve the sign of a by XORing the sign of
ra with the sign of r. For the sake of clarity, we use the superscript
B to denote the boolean shares.
Offline: P1, P2 sample random r1 ∈ Z2ℓ and set p1 = msb(r1) while
P0, P2 sample random r2 and set p2 = msb(r2).
– Parties non-interactively generate ⟦·⟧-shares of r1 as ⟦r1⟧P0 = (0, 0),
⟦r1⟧P1 = (r1, 0) and ⟦r1⟧P2 = (r1, 0).
– Parties non-interactively generate ⟦·⟧-shares of r2 as ⟦r2⟧P0 =
(0, −r2),
⟦r2⟧P1 = (0, 0) and ⟦r2⟧P2 = (0, −r2).
– Parties execute ΠmMul on r1 and r2 to generate ⟦r⟧ = ⟦r1r2⟧.
– Parties non-interactively generate boolean shares of p1 as ⟦p1⟧BP0 =
(0, 0), ⟦p1⟧BP1 = (p1, 0) and ⟦p1⟧BP2 = (p1, 0).
– Parties non-interactively generate boolean shares of p2 as ⟦p2⟧BP0 =
(0, p2), ⟦p2⟧BP1 = (0, 0) and ⟦p2⟧BP2 = (0, p2).
– Parties locally compute ⟦p⟧B = ⟦p1⟧B ⊕ ⟦p2⟧B
Online:
– Parties execute ΠmMul on r and a to generate ra followed by executing
ΠmRec(P0, ra) and ΠmRec(P1, ra) to enable P0, P1 obtain ra.
– P1 execute ΠmSh(P1, q) to generate ⟦q⟧B where q = msb(ra). In parallel,
P0 locally computesmq and sendsH(mq) to P2, who abort if the value
mismatch with one received from P1.
– Parties locally compute ⟦msb(a)⟧B = ⟦p⟧B⊕ ⟦q⟧B.
Figure 13: Protocol ΠmBitExt(⟦a⟧,P)
For the malicious case, we cannot solely rely on P0 to generate
⟦msb(ra)⟧B. Themodified protocol for themalicious setting appears
in Figure 13. The correctness for the malicious version appears in
Appendix D. The communication and round complexity are given
below.
Lemma 5.2. ΠsBitExt requires no communication during the offline
step, while it requires two rounds and communication of 2ℓ + 2 bits
during the online step. ΠmBitExt requires four rounds and an amortized
communication of 46ℓ bits during the offline step, while it requires
three rounds and an amortized communication of 6ℓ + 1 bits during
the online step.
5.5 ML Prediction Functions and Abstractions
We consider four prediction functions – two from regression cate-
gory with real or continuous value as the output and two from clas-
sification type with a bit as the output. The inputs to the functions
are vectors of decimal values. We provide a high-level overview of
the functions below andmore details can be found in [49, 50, 52].
◦ Linear Regression: Model M owns a d-dimensional model pa-
rameter ®w and a bias b, while client C has a d-dimensional query
vector ®z. C obtains flinr
(( ®w, b), ®z) = ®w⊙®z+b, where ®w⊙®z denotes
the dot-product of ®w and ®z.
◦ SVM Regression: M holds {α j ,yj }kj=1, d-dimensional support
vectors {®xj }kj=1 and bias b, while Pc holds a d-dimensional query
®z. C obtains fsvmr
(({α j ,yj , ®xj }kj=1), ®z) = ∑kj=1 α jyj (®xj ⊙ ®z) + b.
◦ Logistic Regression: The inputs of M and C are similar to linear
regression. M needs to provide an additional input t in the range
[0, 1]. C obtains flogr
(( ®w, b, t), ®z) = sign(( ®w ⊙ ®z + b) − ln ( t1−t )),
where sign(·) returns the sign bit of its argument. Since the values
are represented in 2’s complement representation, sign() returns
the most significant bit (MSB) of its argument.
◦ SVM Classification: The inputs of M and C remain the same as
in SVM regression. But the output to C changes to fsvmc
(({α j ,
yj , ®xj }kj=1), ®z
)
= sign(∑kj=1 α jyj (®xj ⊙ ®z) + b).
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND BENCHMARKING
In this section, we provide empirical results for our 3PC and secure
prediction protocols. We start with the description of the setup
environment– software, hardware, and network.
Network & Hardware Details. We have experimented both in a
LAN (local) and a WAN (cloud) setting. In the LAN setting, our ma-
chines (P0, P1, P2) are equipped with Intel Core i7-7790 CPU with
3.6 GHz processor speed and 32 GB RAM. In the WAN setting, we
use Microsoft Azure Cloud Services with machines located in South
East Asia (P0), North Europe (P1) and North Central US (P2). We
used Standard E4s v3 instances, where machines are equipped with
32 GB RAM and 4 vcpus. Every pair of parties are connected by
bi-directional communication channels in both the LAN and WAN
setting, facilitating simultaneous data exchange between them. We
consider a LAN with 1Gbps and a WAN with 25Mbps channel
bandwidth. We measured the average round-trip time (rtt) for com-
municating 1 KB of data between P0-P1, P1-P2 and P0-P2 in both the
setting. In the LAN setting, the average rtt turned out to be 0.47ms .
In the WAN setting, the rtt between P0-P1, P1-P2 and P0-P2 are
201.928ms , 81.736ms and 229.792ms respectively. We use a TCP-IP
connection between each set of parties.
Software Details. Our code follows the standards of C++11. We
implemented our protocols in both semi-honest and malicious set-
ting, using ENCRYPTO library [24]. We used SHA-256 to instantiate
the hash function. We use multi-threading to facilitate efficient com-
putation and communication among the parties. For benchmarking,
we use the AES-128 [1] circuit. For ML prediction, since the code
for ABY3 [50] was not available, we implemented their protocols
in our framework for benchmarking. We run each experiment 20
times and report the average for our measurements.
Parameters for Comparison. All our constructions are compared
against their closest competitors which are implemented in our
environment for a fair comparison. We consider five parameters
for comparison– latency (calculated as the maximum of the run-
time of the parties or servers in case of secure prediction) in both
LAN and WAN, total communication complexity and throughput
of the online phase over LAN and WAN. For 3PC over LAN, the
throughput is calculated as the number of AES circuits that can
be computed per second. As an AES evaluation takes more than a
second in WAN, we change the notion of throughput in WAN to
the number of AND gates that can be computed per second. For
the case of secure prediction, throughput is taken as a number of
queries that can be processed per second in LAN and per minute
in WAN. For simplicity, we use online throughput to denote the
throughput of the online phase. The discrepancy across the bench-
marking parameters for LAN and WAN comes from the difference
in rtt (order of microseconds for LAN and milliseconds for WAN).
6.1 Experimental Results
6.1.1 Results for 3PC. In Table 3, we compare our 3PCs over the
boolean ring (Z2 ) both in semi-honest and malicious setting with
their closest competitors [4] and [2] respectively in terms of latency
and communication.
Protocol Work LAN Latency (ms) WAN Latency (s) Communication (KB)
Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online
Semi-honest
[4] 0 254.8 0 8.96 0 1.99
This 0.48 254.8 0.23 3.19 0.66 1.33
Malicious
[2] 1.44 260.72 0.71 9.42 8.06 6.06
This 2.37 248.38 0.88 3.57 10.72 2.69
Table 3: Comparison of Our 3PC with [4] and [2]
Note that Table 3 does not include the runtime and commu-
nication for input-sharing and output-reconstruction phases. We
provide the runtime and communication of our protocol for the
aforementioned phases in Table 4. For benchmarking, we let P0 own
48 out of the 128 input wires of AES while P1 and P2 own 40 wires
each. The table provides benchmarking for the fair reconstruction
phase as well, which sees an increase in the latency for the online
phase due to increased round complexity.
Phase Protocol LAN Latency (ms) WAN Latency (s) Comm. (KB)
Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online
Input
Sharing
Semi-honest 0
0.47
0
0.23
0.01 0.02
Malicious 0.47 0.23 0.02 0.03
Output
Reconstruction
Semi-honest
0 0.47 0 0.23 0
0.05
Malicious 0.09
Fair Output
Reconstruction Malicious 0.47 1.91 0.23 0.77 0.25 0.19
Table 4: Benchmarking for Input Sharing andOutput Recon-
struction Phases of Our 3PC Protocol
In the semi-honest setting, we observe that the online latency
for [4] and our protocol remain same over LAN. This is because
both protocols require the same number of rounds of interaction
during the online phase and the rtt among every pair of parties
remain the same. Over WAN, our protocol outperforms [4] in terms
of online latency. We observe that this improvement comes from
the asymmetry in the rtt among the parties. In detail, our protocol
has only one pair amongst the three pairs of parties to communicate
for most of the rounds in the online phase. Thus, when compared
with existing protocols, we have an additional privilege where we
can assign the roles of the parties effectively across the machines
so that the pair of parties having the most communication in the
online phase is assigned the lowest rtt. As a result, the time taken by
a single round of communication comes down to the minimum of
the rtts among all the pairs, as opposed to the maximum. Thus we
achieve a gain of (maximum rtt)/(minimum rtt) in time per round
of communication, compared to the existing protocols.
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Figure 14: Plot of Online Latency against Multiplicative
Depth for 3PC Protocols
In Figure 14, we compare the online latency of our protocols with
their competitors, for a varying multiplicative depth (that dictates
the round complexity). The same plot applies to both the semi-
honest setting and malicious setting, as they differ by a single round
and its impact vanishes with the growing number of rounds. It is
clear from the plot that the impact of rtt becomes more visible with
the increase in the number of online rounds, leading to improved
efficiency.
Setting Semi-honest Malicious
[4] This Improv. [2] This Improv.
LAN 3296.7 3296.7 1× 3221.85 3381.91 1.05×
WAN 8.71 M 13.1 M 1.51× 2.9 M 4.34 M 1.50×
Table 5: Comparison of 3PC Online Throughput
Now, we compare the online throughput for 3PC over both LAN
(#AES/sec) and WAN (#AND/sec) setting and the results appear in
Table 5 (‘M’ denotes million and ‘Improv.’ denotes improvement).
Table 5 shows that our protocol’s online throughput is clearly better
than that of its competitors. This is mainly because of the improve-
ment in online communication, though the asymmetry in our proto-
col has a contribution to it. In the semi-honest setting, our protocol
is able to effectively push around 33% of the total communication
to the offline phase, resulting in an improved online phase. In the
malicious setting, our protocol reduces online communication by a
factor of 2.25× with an increase in the offline phase by a factor of
1.75×, when compared with the state-of-the-art protocols.
6.1.2 Results for Secure Prediction. We benchmark our ML proto-
cols that cover regression functions (linear and SVM) and classifi-
cation functions (logistic and SVM) over a ring Z264 . We report our
performance for MNIST database [46] that has d = 784 features
and compare our results with ABY3 [50] (with the removal of extra
tools as mentioned in the introduction). The comparison of latency
and communication appears below.
Regression. For regression, the servers compute ⟦·⟧-shares of
the function ®w ⊙ ®z + b, given the ⟦·⟧-shares of ⟦ ®w⟧, ⟦®z⟧ and ⟦b⟧.
This is computed by parties executing secure dot-product on ⟦ ®w⟧
and ⟦®z⟧, followed by locally adding the result with ⟦·⟧-shares of
b. Here we provide benchmarking for two regression algorithms,
namely Linear Regression and Linear SVM Regression. Though the
aforementioned algorithms serve a different purpose, we observe
that their underlying computation is same from the viewpoint of
the servers, apart from the values ®w, ®z and b being different as
mentioned in Section 5.5. Thus we provide a single benchmark,
capturing both the algorithms and the results appear in Table 6.
Setting Work
Semi-honest Malicious
Offline Online Offline Online
LAN
(ms)
ABY3 0 0.62 1.61 1.56
This 0.52 0.61 2.56 1.07
WAN
(s)
ABY3 0 0.23 0.72 0.70
This 0.23 0.09 1.1 0.44
Comm.
(KB)
ABY3 0 0.02 73.5 55.13
This 0.01 0.01 128.63 12.27
Table 6: Comparison of Latency and Communication for Re-
gression Protocols
In the semi-honest setting, similar online latency for both proto-
cols over LAN can be justified by the similar rtt among parties. Over
WAN, the asymmetry in the rtt among the parties (as mentioned
for the case of 3PC) adds benefit to our protocol. In the malicious
setting, the result is further improved, since we require one less
round when compared with ABY3 in the online phase.
Setting Semi-honest Malicious
ABY3 This Improv. ABY3 This Improv.
LAN 0.645 M 0.656 M 1.02× 0.007 M 0.010 M 1.5×
WAN 0.104 M 0.267 M 2.56× 0.010 M 0.016 M 1.5×
Table 7: Online Throughput of Regression Protocols
We now provide an online throughput comparison of our re-
gression protocols over LAN (queries/sec) and WAN (queries/min)
setting and the result appear in Table 7.We observe that the through-
put was further boosted in the malicious setting because of our
efficient dot-product protocol (Section 5.4) with which we could im-
prove the online communication by a factor of 4.5×when compared
to ABY3.
In Figure 15, we present a comparison of online throughput
(#queries/sec for LAN and #queries/min for WAN) against the num-
ber of features in the malicious setting, for a number of features
varying from 500 to 2500. Since the online communication cost
is independent of the feature size in the semi-honest setting, we
omit to plot the same. The plot clearly shows that our protocol
for regression outperforms ABY3 in terms of online throughput.
The reduction in throughput with the increase in feature size for
both ours as well as ABY3’s can be explained with the increase in
communication for higher feature sizes.
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Figure 15: Plot of Online Throughput against Multiplicative
Depth for Regression Protocols
Classification. For classification, the servers compute ⟦·⟧B-shares
of the function sign( ®w⊙®z+b), given the ⟦·⟧-shares of ⟦ ®w⟧, ⟦®z⟧ and
⟦b⟧. Towards this, parties first execute secure dot-product on ⟦ ®w⟧
and ⟦®z⟧, followed by locally adding the result with ⟦b⟧. Then parties
execute secure comparison protocol on the result obtained from
the previous step to generate the boolean share of sign( ®w ⊙ ®z + b).
Here we consider two classification algorithms, namely Logistic
Regression and Linear SVM Classification. Similar to the case with
Regression, both algorithms share the same computation from the
server’s perspective and thus we provide a single benchmark. The
results appear in Table 8 and the online throughput comparison
appears in Table 9.
Setting Work
Semi-honest Malicious
Offline Online Offline Online
LAN
(ms)
ABY3 0 3.48 1.63 4.42
This 0.54 1.58 2.57 2.53
WAN
(s)
ABY3 0 1.61 0.72 2.08
This 0.23 0.55 1.1 0.98
Comm.
(KB)
ABY3 0 0.07 73.7 55.3
This 0.01 0.04 129 12.4
Table 8: Comparison of Latency and Communication for
Classification Protocols
Setting Semi-honest Malicious
ABY3 This Improv. ABY3 This Improv.
LAN 0.115 M 0.253 M 2.2× 0.007 M 0.010 M 1.5×
WAN 0.015 M 0.044 M 2.93× 0.010 M 0.016 M 1.5×
Table 9: Online Throughput of Classification Protocols
In this case, we observe that our protocol outperforms ABY3
in all the settings. This is mainly due to our Secure Comparison
protocol (Section 5.4) where we improve upon both communication
and rounds in the online phase. The effect of this improvement
becomes more visible for applications where the secure comparison
is used extensively. Similar to Regression, in Figure 16, we provide
below a comparison of online throughput (#queries/sec for LAN
and #queries/min for WAN) against the number of features in the
malicious setting.
6.2 Restricted Bandwidth Setting
We observe that the asymmetry of our constructions further comes
to our advantage for throughput. That is, while a drop in bandwidth
between any pair of parties significantly affects the throughput of
the existing protocols, the throughput of ours does not get affected
much as long as the drop occurs between the pair(s) of parties
handling a low volume of data. The purpose of this setting is to
show that for setups with varying bandwidths among the servers,
our protocol has an advantage in choosing the roles of the servers
whereas existing works cannot.
To demonstrate this positive impact, we test the throughput of
our ML constructions in a modified network setting where the
bandwidth between one of the pairs, namely P0 and P2 is restricted
to 100Mbps (instead of 1Gbps) in LAN and 10Mbps (instead of
25Mbps) in WAN setting. This restriction significantly drops the
throughput of the existing constructions as they need all the pairs
to communicate equally, while ours remain unaffected. The cut-
down on bandwidth does not make any difference in latency (that
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Figure 16: Plot of Online Throughput against Multiplicative
Depth for Classification Protocols
is measured for one execution) and communication complexity. We
provide a comparison of throughput in the malicious setting in
Table 10.
Setting Regression Classification
ABY3 This Improv. ABY3 This Improv.
LAN 0.001 M 0.010 M 15× 0.001 M 0.010 M 15.01×
WAN 0.004 M 0.016 M 3.75× 0.004 M 0.016 M 3.75×
Table 10: Online Throughput of ML Protocols in the Mali-
cious Setting under Restricted Bandwidth
The comparison of online throughput (#queries/sec for LAN
while #queries/min for WAN) against the number of features in the
malicious setting for classification protocols appear in Figure 17.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we presented efficient protocols for the three party
setting (3PC) tolerating at most one corruption. We applied our
results in the domain of secure machine learning prediction for a
range of functions – Linear Regression, Linear SVM Regression,
Logistic Regression, and Linear SVM classification. The theoretical
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Figure 17: Plot of Online Throughput against Multiplicative
Depth for Classification Protocols in the Malicious Setting
under Restricted Bandwidth
improvements over the state-of-the-art protocols were backed up
by an extensive benchmarking.
Open Problems. Our techniques are tailor-made for 3PC with
1 corruption. Extending these techniques to the case of an arbitrary
Q(2) adversary structure [61] is left as an open problem.
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A BUILDING BLOCKS FOR MALICIOUS
SECURITY
A.1 Instantiating Ftrip
Here, we present a protocol Πtrip (Figure 18) that instantiate func-
tionality Ftrip over Z2ℓ , inspired by the works of [2, 33]. The tech-
niques of [2, 33] work for any underlying linear secret-sharing
scheme. We avoid the detailed security proof for Πtrip, which can
be easily derived from [2, 33]. We begin with a sub-protocol Πrand,
used in Πtrip. Protocol Πrand allows the parties to generate a ran-
dom and private ⟦·⟧-shared value v. Towards this, parties P0, P1
locally sample λv,1, P0, P2 sample λv,2 while parties P1, P2 sample
mv. The value v is defined as v = mv − λv,1 − λv,2.
If a party obtains ⊥ during any stage of the protocol or did not receive
an expected message, then it outputs ⊥ and abort.
– Generating Multiplication Triples Optimistically: Let M =
BN + C . The parties execute 2M instances of Πrand to generate
{(⟦dk ⟧,
⟦ek ⟧)}k=1, . . .,M . For k = 1, . . . , BN +C , the parties execute ΠsMul on
⟦dk ⟧ and ⟦ek ⟧ to obtain ⟦fk ⟧. Let ®D = [(⟦dk ⟧, ⟦ek ⟧, ⟦fk ⟧)]k=1, . . .,M .
– Cut and Bucket: Here the parties perform the first verification by
opening C triples, and then randomly divide the remainder into buck-
ets as follows.
– The parties generate a random permutation π over {1, . . . , BN +
C } and permute the elements of ®D according to π .
– The parties publicly reconstruct each of the first C triples in ®D (by
executing ΠsRec(⟦·⟧, P) and output ⊥, if any of these C triples is
not a multiplication triple.
– The remaining BN triples in ®D are arranged into buckets B1, . . . ,
BN , each containing B triples.
– Check Buckets: The parties initialize a vector ®d of length N . Then,
for k = 1, . . . , N , the parties do the following:
– Let {(⟦dk, j⟧, ⟦ek, j⟧, ⟦fk, j⟧)}j=1, . . .,B denote the B shared triples
in the bucket Bk .
– For j = 2, . . . , B , the parties execute Πprc on (⟦dk,1⟧,
⟦ek,1⟧, ⟦fk,1⟧) and (⟦dk, j⟧, ⟦ek, j⟧, ⟦fk, j⟧).
– The parties set (⟦dk,1⟧, ⟦ek,1⟧, ⟦fk,1⟧) as the k th entry of ®d .
The parties output ®d .
Figure 18: Protocol to generate N random and private ⟦·⟧-shared
multiplication triples
Following the technique of [33], protocol Πtrip generates N in-
dependent ⟦·⟧-shared random and private multiplication triplets
over Z2ℓ at one go. Informally, the parties first optimistically gen-
erate BN + C shared random triples, followed by deploying the
cut-and-choose technique. NamelyC triples from the set of BN +C
triples are randomly selected and opened to check if they are mul-
tiplication triples. The remaining BN triples are randomly grouped
into N buckets, each containing B triples. In each bucket, parties
check if the first triple is a multiplication triple without opening
it using the protocol Πprc (Figure 7), by deploying the remaining
B − 1 triples in the bucket, one by one. If any of these verifications
fail, then the parties abort, else they consider the first triple in each
of the N buckets as the final output. Following [33], it follows that
except with an error probability of at most 1N B−1 , if any of the N
output triplets is not a multiplication triplet, then the honest parties
abort the protocol.
In their follow-up work [2], the authors have shown how to
reduce the error probability of cut-and-choose technique from
1
N B−1 to
1
N B , thus reducing the bucket size B to
s
log2 N
to attain a
statistical-security of 2−s . The idea behind their improvement is as
follows: if the array of multiplication triples from the offline phase
is randomly shuffled after all multiplication gates are evaluated
(optimistically), then adversary can successfully cheat only if the
random shuffle happens to match correct triples with correctly
evaluated multiplication gates and incorrect triples with incorrectly
evaluated multiplication gates.
We observe that the above modification is applicable in our
context as well. Following [2], the parties can postpone verification
of offline step of all the instances of ΠmMul. Once the offline step of
all the instances of ΠmMul corresponding to all the multiplication
gates in the circuit is executed, the parties can randomly shuffle
the set of triples. The parties can then use the ith triple from the
reshuffled set to perform the pending verification corresponding to
the offline step of the ith instance of ΠmMul. Notice that unlike [2],
in our context, the reshuffling of the set of triples happens in the
offline phase itself. Excluding the cost of generating the random
permutation π in the protocol of Figure 18, the amortized cost of
generating a single multiplication triple will be as follows: there will
be 2B instances of Πrand followed by B instances of ΠsMul, followed
by B − 1 instances of Πprc.
A.2 Properties of Πprc
Lemma A.1 (Correctness [20, 33]). Let (⟦d⟧, ⟦e⟧, ⟦f⟧) be ⟦·⟧
sharing of random and private values d, e and f, such that f = de.
Moreover, let (⟦a⟧, ⟦b⟧, ⟦c⟧) be ⟦·⟧ sharing of a, b and c, such that
c = ab+∆, where ∆ ∈ Z2ℓ . Then the following hold in Πprc: If ∆ , 0,
then every honest Pi outputs ⊥.
Proof. In Πprc, during the reconstruction of ρ, σ and τ , protocol
ΠmRec ensures that no two honest parties output two different non-⊥
values. Now, in order to show the correctness, it suffices to show
that τ = 0 iff ∆ = 0. Note that,
τ = c − f − σd − ρe − σρ
= c − de − (b − e)d − (a − d)e − (b − e)(a − d)
= c − ab = ∆
It is straightforward from the protocol step that every honest party
outputs ⊥ if ∆ , 0. □
The privacy of Πprc requires it to maintain the privacy of a, b
and c. Note that the values ρ and σ reveal nothing about a and b, as
d, e are random and private. The privacy now follows since τ = ∆
and independent of a, b and c.
B 3PCWITH SEMI-HONEST SECURITY
Here we prove that Πs3pc securely realizes the standard ideal-
world functionality F3pc (Figure 5) for securely evaluating any
arithmetic circuit over Z2ℓ . Our proof works in the Fsetup-hybrid
model.
Fsetup interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S who may
corrupt one of the parties.
Fsetup picks random keys k01, k02, k12, kP ∈ {0, 1}κ and sends
(k01, k02), (k01, k12) and (k02, k12) to P0, P1 and P2 respectively. In addi-
tion, Fsetup sends kP to all the parties.
Figure 19: Functionality Fsetup (semi-honest)
We first consider the simple case, when P0 is corrupted. Intuitively,
the security follows from the fact, that P0 does not see the messages
exchanged between P1, P2 during the online phase, who actually
perform the circuit-evaluation. So in essence, this is equivalent to
P1, P2 using the preprocessing done by a trusted third party to do
the circuit-evaluation (in the semi-honest setting, even a corrupt
P0 will do the pre-processing honestly).
Theorem B.1. Protocol Πs3pc securely realizes the functionality
F3pc against a static, semi-honest adversary A in the Fsetup-hybrid
model, who corrupts P0.
Proof. LetA be a real-world semi-honest adversary corrupting
the distributor P0 during the protocol Πs3pc. We present an ideal-
world adversary (simulator) Ss3pc for A in Figure 20 that simulates
messages for corrupt P0. The only communication to P0 is during
the output-reconstruction stage in the online phase. Ss3pc can easily
simulate thesemessages, with the knowledge of function output and
the masks corresponding to the circuit-output wires.
The simulator plays the role of the honest parties P1, P2 and simulates
each step of Πs3pc to corrupt P0 as follows and finally outputs A’s output.
Offline Phase: Ss3pc emulates Fsetup and gives k01, k02 and kP to P0.
In addition, Ss3pc on behalf of P2 receives γxy,2 from A for every multi-
plication gate g = (wx , wy, wz ). From these, it learns the λ-masks for
all the wires in ckt.
Online Phase: On input {xi }’s, the inputs of corrupt P0 and the func-
tion output (y1, . . . , yO), Ss3pc simulates the output-reconstruction stage
to A as follows. For every yj , it computes myj = yj + λyj and sends
it to A, on the behalf of P1. Here λyj is the mask corresponding to the
output yj which Ss3pc can compute since he learns the entire λ-masks
during the offline phase.
Figure 20: Simulator Ss3pc for the case of corrupt P0
The proof now simply follows from the fact that simulated view
and real-world view of the adversary are computationally indistin-
guishable. □
We next consider the case, when the adversary corrupts one of
the evaluators. Without loss of generality, we consider the case of
a corrupt P1 and the case of a corrupt P2 is handled symmetrically.
Intuitively, the security, in this case, follows from the fact that
each λ-mask is random (from the properties of the underlying PRF)
and the one share that is learned by corrupt P1 for each mask
leaks nothing about them and hence the masked values reveal no
additional information about the actual values over the wires.
Theorem B.2. Protocol Πs3pc securely realizes the functionality
F3pc against a static, semi-honest adversary A in the Fsetup-hybrid
model, who corrupts P1 (and similarly P2).
Proof. LetA be a real-world semi-honest adversary corrupting
the evaluator P1 during the protocol Πs3pc. We now present the steps
of the ideal-world adversary (simulator) Ss3pc for A for this case in
Figure 21. At a high level, Ss3pc itself does the honest pre-processing
on the behalf of P0 and will simulate the entire circuit-evaluation,
assuming the circuit-inputs of P0 and P2 to be 0. In the output-
reconstruction stage, it “adjusts" the shares of circuit-output values
on the behalf of P2 so that A sees the same function output as in
the real-world protocol.
The simulator plays the role of the honest parties P0, P2 and simulates
each step of the protocol Πs3pc to corrupt P1 as follows and finally outputs
A’s output.
Offline Phase: Ss3pc emulates Fsetup and gives k01, k12 and kP to P1.
Ss3pc chooses a random key k02. With these, Ss3pc, on the behalf of P0,
executes the offline steps of the instances of ΠsSh, Π
s
Mul and ΠAdd for
circuit-inputs, multiplication and addition gates respectively. In the pro-
cess, it learns the masks for each wire in the ckt and γ -values for each
multiplication gate.
Online Phase:
– Sharing Circuit-input Values: For every circuit-input x j that P0 inputs,
Ss3pc sets x j = 0 and simulates the messages of P0 as part of the online
steps of ΠsSh(P0, x j ).The inputs owned by P2 are simulated similarly.
– Gate Evaluation: The simulator simulates the evaluation of each gate
g according to the topological order. No simulation is needed for an
addition gate. If g is a multiplication gate, then the simulator simulates
the messages of P2 as part of the online steps of the corresponding
instance of ΠsMul.
– Output Reconstruction: For j = 1, . . . , O let [λyj ] = (λyj ,1, λyj ,2) be
the sharing, available with the simulator and letmyj be the simulated
masked output, corresponding to yj , available with A. On input
{xi }’s, the inputs of corrupt P1 and the function output (y1, . . . , yO),
as part of online steps of the instance ΠsRec([λyj ]), the simulator sends
myj − λyj ,1 − yj as the share of λyj , on the behalf of P2 to A.
Figure 21: Simulator Ss3pc for the case of corrupt P1
It is easy to see that the simulated view and the real-world view
of the adversary are computationally indistinguishable. □
C 3PCWITH MALICIOUS SECURITY
Here we prove that Πm3pc securely realizes the standard ideal-world
functionality F Abort3pc (Figure 9) for securely evaluating any arith-
metic circuit over Z2ℓ with selective abort. Our proof works in
{Fsetup,Ftrip}-hybrid model.
Fsetup interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S. Fsetup picks
random keys k01, k02, k12, kP ∈ {0, 1}κ .
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output, ⊥) to all
the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, yi ) to the adversary S, where
yi = (ki1, ki2, kP ) when P0 is corrupt and yi = (k0i , k12, kP ) when
Pi ∈ {P1, P2 } is corrupt.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I }) from
adversary S, where {I } denotes a subset of the honest parties. If an
honest party Pi belongs to I , send (Output, ⊥), else send (Output, yi ).
Here yi = (ki1, ki2, kP ) when Pi = P0 and yi = (k0i , k12, kP ) when
Pi ∈ {P1, P2 }
Figure 22: Functionality Fsetup (malicious)
Since the protocol Πm3pc differs from Π
s
3pc mainly in three protocols
– sharing (ΠmSh), reconstruction (Π
m
Rec) and multiplication (Π
m
Mul)
protocols, we provide the details of simulation for the same. We
begin with the case, when P0 is corrupted.
Theorem C.1. In {Fsetup,Ftrip}-hybrid model, Πm3pc securely re-
alizes the functionality F Abort3pc against a static, malicious adversary
A, who corrupts P0.
Proof. Let A be a real-world malicious adversary corrupting
P0 during Πm3pc. We present an ideal-world adversary (simulator)
Sm3pc for A, who plays the roles of honest P1, P2 and simulates the
messages received by P0 during the protocol. The simulation is
similar as in the semi-honest setting, where the simulator simu-
lates P1, P2 with random inputs and keeps track of all the values
that the parties (both honest and corrupt) are supposed to hold.
Based on this, the simulator can find out whether the corrupt P0
is sending an incorrect message(s) in any of the sub-protocols and
accordingly simulates honest parties aborting the protocol. The
simulator initializes a Boolean variable flag = 0, which indicates
whether the honest parties abort during the simulation. Similar
to the semi-honest setting, Sm3pc invokes the simulator Smsetup and
learns the shared keys among P0-P1 and P0-P2, namely k01 and k02
and the key kP . From the shared keys, it learns the λ-masks for
all the wires in ckt. The details of Sm3pc for the offline phase is as
follows:
– Offline Step of the instances ΠmSh and Π
m
Rec: Here the simulator
has to simulate nothing, as the offline phase involves no commu-
nication.
– Offline Step of the instances ΠmMul(wx j ,wy j ,wz j ): The simulator
receives γx jyj ,2 from A on behalf of P2. Simulator then picks
random δx j ,δyj and δzj and their [·]-shares on behalf of P1, P2
and honestly simulates the messages of P1, P2 as per the protocol
ΠmMul. Namely, the simulator learns fromA the inputs withwhich
P0 wants to call Ftrip. If the input of P0 to Ftrip is ⊥, then the
simulator sets flag = 1, else the simulator plays the role of Ftrip
honestly with the inputs received on behalf of P0 and generates
a ⟦·⟧-sharing of a randomly chosen multiplication triplet (d, e, f).
On behalf of P1, P2, the simulator sends to A the [·]-shares of
χ . For the instance of Πprc, the simulator honestly simulates
the messages of P1, P2 towards P0. Moreover, the simulator sets
flag = 1, if it finds that γx jyj , λx j λyj .
The details of Sm3pc for simulating the messages of the online
phase are as follows. Informally, the simulator extracts the circuit-
inputs of P0 from the masked circuit-inputs which P0 sends to
the evaluators since the simulator will know the corresponding
mask. The simulator then sets the circuit-inputs of P1, P2 to some
arbitrary values and simulates the steps of the online phase. During
the evaluation of multiplication gates, P0 receives versions of m⋆x
andm⋆y , which can be easily simulated as the simulator has selected
them. Finally, while simulating the public reconstruction of ⟦·⟧-
shared circuit-outputs, the simulator adjusts the shares of P1, P2, so
that P0 receives the same output as it would have received in the
execution of the real-world protocol. As done in the simulation of
the offline phase, the simulator keeps track of all the values that
the corrupt P0 possess and sets flag = 1 if it finds that P0 is sending
an inconsistent value during the simulated execution.
– Online Step of the instances ΠmSh(Pi ,x j ): If Pi = P0, then the sim-
ulator receives mx j and m′x j from A on behalf of P1 and P2 re-
spectively. The simulator sets flag = 1 if it finds that mx j , m′x j ,
else it extracts the inputs x j of P0 as x j = mx j − λx j , where λx j
is the mask which the simulator learnt during the offline step. If
Pi ∈ {P1, P2}, then nothing needs to be simulated as P0 does not
receive any message as a part of online step of such instances
of ΠmSh(Pi ,x j ). For such instances, the simulator sets x j = 0 and
accordingly computes the simulated ⟦x j⟧.
– Online Step of the instances ΠmMul(wx j ,wy j ,wz j ): The simula-
tor honestly performs the steps of P1, P2 for this instance and
computes the simulated ⟦zj⟧. On behalf of P1, the simulator
sends m⋆x j = mx j + δx j and m
⋆
yj = myj + δyj to A, while he
sends hash of the same to A on behalf of P2. The simulator
receives H(m⋆zj ) and H(m⋆z′j ) from A on behalf of P1 and P2 re-
spectively. The simulator sets flag = 1 if H(m⋆zj ) , H(m⋆z′j ) or if
H(m⋆zj ) , H(mzj −m⋆x jm⋆yj + δzj ).
– Obtaining function outputs: If flag is set to 1 during any step of the
simulation till now, then the simulator sends ⊥ to F Abort3pc , which
corresponds to the case that in the real-world protocol, the honest
parties abort before reaching to the output-reconstruction stage,
implying that no party receives the output. Else the simulator
sends inputs {x j } extracted on behalf of P0 to F Abort3pc and receives
the function outputs y1, . . . ,yO.
– Simulating the instances of ΠmRec(⋆,P) during the output- recon-
struction: For j = 1, . . . ,O, let [λyj ] = (λyj ,1, λyj ,2) be the [·]-
shared mask, corresponding to the jth circuit-output, available
with the simulator. Then as a part of the jth instance of ΠmRec, the
simulator sendsyj +λyj andH(yj +λyj ) toA on behalf of P1 and
P2 respectively. Moreover, the simulator receives H(λy′j ,i ) from
A on behalf of Pi for i ∈ {1, 2}. The simulator initializes the set
I to . If H(λy′j ,i,1) , H(λyj ,i,1) then the simulator includes Pi
to the set I . The simulator then sends the set I to F Abort3pc and
terminates.
The proof now follows from the fact that simulated view and real-
world view of a corrupt P0 are computationally indistinguishable.
□
We next consider the case, when the adversary corrupts one of
the evaluators, say P1.
Theorem C.2. In the {Fsetup,Ftrip}-hybrid model, Πm3pc securely
realizes the functionality F Abort3pc against a static, malicious adversary
A, who corrupts P1.
Proof. The correctness follows similar to Theorem C.1. We
now focus on privacy. Let A be a real-world malicious adversary
corrupting the evaluator P1 during the protocol Πm3pc. We present
an ideal-world adversary (simulator) Sm3pc for A, who plays the
roles of honest P0, P2 and simulates the messages received by P1
during the protocol. Sm3pc invokes the simulator Smsetup and learns
the shared keys among P1-P0 and P1-P2, namely k01 and k12 and
the key kP . In addition, Sm3pc chooses a random key k02. The details
of Sm3pc for the offline phase is as follows:
– Offline Step of the instances ΠmSh and Π
m
Rec: Here the simulator
has to simulate nothing, as the offline phase involves no commu-
nication.
– Offline Step of the instances ΠmMul(wx j ,wy j ,wz j ): On behalf of P0,
the simulator computes γx jyj = λx j λyj . In addition, simulator
learns γx jyj ,1 that A computes, for the shared key k01. With
these, simulator computes γx jyj ,2 = γx jyj −γx jyj ,1. On behalf of
P2, simulator computes δx j ,δyj ,δzj ,1 and δzj ,2 using the key k12.
The simulator receives from A, the input with which P1 wants
to call Ftrip. If this input is ⊥, then the simulator sets flag = 1.
Else the simulator itself honestly performs the steps of Ftrip and
generates ⟦·⟧-sharing of a random multiplication triplet (d, e, f).
The simulator then receives χ1 from A on behalf of P0. The
simulator then computes ⟦a⟧, ⟦b⟧, ⟦c⟧ and honestly executes the
steps of Πprc on behalf of P0, P2. Moreover, the simulator sets
flag = 1, if χ1 , δx j λyj ,1 + δyj λx j ,1 + δzj ,1 − γx jyj ,1, else the
simulator computes χ = χ1 + χ2.
The details of Sm3pc for simulating the messages of the online phase
are as follows.
– Online Step of the instances ΠmSh(Pi ,x j ): If Pi = P0, then on behalf
of P0, the simulator sets x j = 0 and sends mx j = 0 + λx j to A.
Then on behalf of P2, the simulator receives H(mx ′j ) from A,
which P1 wants to send to P2; the simulator sets flag = 1 if it
finds that H(mx ′j ) , H(mx j ). If Pi = P1, then on behalf of P2, the
simulator receives mx j from A, which P1 wants to send to P2
and extract the input x j = mx j − λx j of P1. If Pi = P2, then the
simulator sets x j = 0 and sends mx j = 0 + λx j to A on behalf of
P2.
– Online Step of the instances ΠmMul(wx j ,wy j ,wz j ): On behalf of
P2, the simulator honestly sends the [·]-share of mzj to A. Then
on behalf of P2, the simulator receives from A the [·]-share of
mzj , which P1 wants to send to P2. The simulator checks if this
share is correct and accordingly sets flag = 1. The simulator
then receives m⋆x j and m
⋆
yj from A on behalf of P0, which P1
wants to send to P0. The simulator sets flag = 1, if it finds that
m⋆x j , mx j + δx j or m
⋆
yj , myj + δyj . On behalf of P0, the
simulator sends m⋆zj = −λyj ·m⋆x j − λx j ·m⋆yj + δzj + 2γx jyj + χ
to A.
– Obtaining function outputs: If flag is set to 1 during any step of
the simulation till now, then the simulator sends ⊥ to F Abort3pc .
Else the simulator sends inputs x j extracted on behalf of P1 to
F Abort3pc and receives the function outputs y1, . . . ,yO.
– Simulating the instances of ΠmRec(⋆,P) during the output- re-
construction: For j = 1, . . . ,O, let (λyj ,1,myj ) be the share
of P1 available with the simulator, as a part of the simulated
output sharing ⟦yj⟧. Then as a part of ΠmRec(⟦yj⟧,P), on be-
half of P2 and P0, the simulator sends myj − λyj ,1 − yj and
H(myj − λyj ,1 − yj ) respectively to A, which ensures that A
reconstructs myj − λyj ,1 − (myj − λyj ,1 − yj ) = yj . On behalf of
P0 and P2 respectively, the simulator receives my′j and H(λ′yj ,1)
from A, which P1 wants to send to P0 and P2 respectively as a
part of ΠmRec(⟦yj⟧,P). The simulator initializes the set I to. The
simulator includes P0 to I if it finds that my′j , myj . Similarly,
the simulator includes P2 to I , if it finds that H(λ′yj ,1) , H(λyj ,1).
The simulator then sends the set I to F Abort3pc and terminates.
It is easy to see that the simulated and real-world views of the
adversary are computationally indistinguishable. □
D SECURE PREDICTION
Lemma D.1 (Correctness). In the protocol ΠmBitExt, the following
holds: During the offline phase, honest parties compute either r = r1r2
or output ⊥. During the online phase, honest parties either obtain
sign(ra) or output ⊥.
Proof. During the offline phase, parties locally set ⟦r1⟧P0 =
(0, 0), ⟦r1⟧P1 = (r1, 0) and ⟦r1⟧P2 = (r1, 0), which effectively assign
mr1 = r1 and λr1 = 0. Hence, the aforementioned way of computing
shares non-interactively indeed generates a valid ⟦·⟧-sharing of r1
according to our sharing semantics. Similarly, the ⟦·⟧-sharing of r2
is valid since the parties effectively assign mr2 = 0 and λr2 = −r2.
Given the ⟦·⟧-sharing of r1 and r2, it follows from the correctness
property of protocol ΠmMul (Lemma 4.3) that honest parties compute
either r = r1r2 or output ⊥ during the offline phase.
Similar to the offline phase, following the correctness of ΠmMul,
honest parties either compute ⟦·⟧-sharing of ra correctly or output
⊥ during the online phase. During the reconstruction of ra towards
P0, P1, since each missing share is held by two other parties and
we have at most one corruption, it holds that each of P0, P1 either
obtain ra or output ⊥. Now that the value ra is available with both
P0 and P1, when P1 performs ⟦·⟧-sharing of q = msb(ra), party P2
can cross check hash of mq received from P1 with the one received
from P0. Thus a corrupt P0 or P1 cannot force an honest P2 to accept
a wrong q value. Moreover, the last step where parties compute
⟦·⟧B-shares of p ⊕ q is non-interactive. Hence, the correctness of
online phase is ensured. □
